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1. Guy Debord in the Land of the Long Weekend
It’s  the  weekend  –  leisure  time.  It’s  the  interlude  when,  Guy  Debord  contends,  the
proletarian is briefly free of the “total contempt so clearly built  into every aspect of the
organization and management of production” in commodity capitalism; when workers are
temporarily “treated like grown-ups, with a great show of solicitude and politeness, in their
new  role  as  consumers.”  But  this  patronising  show  turns  out  to  be  another  form  of
subjection to the diktats of “political economy”: “the totality of human existence falls under
the regime of the ‘perfected denial of man’.” (30). As Debord suggests, even the creation of
leisure time and space is predicated upon a form of contempt: the “perfected denial” of who
we, as living people, really are in the eyes of those who presume the power to legislate our
working practices and private identities.
This  Saturday The  Weekend  Australian  runs  an  opinion  piece  by  Christopher  Pearson,
defending ABC Radio National’s Stephen Crittenden, whose program The Religion Report
has been  axed.  “Some of  Crittenden’s finest  half-hours have been  devoted  to Islam in
Australia in the wake of September 11,” Pearson writes. “Again and again he’s confronted a
left-of-centre  audience  that  expected  multi-cultural  pieties  with  disturbing  assertions.”
Along the way in this admirable Crusade, Pearson notes that Crittenden has exposed “the
Left’s recent tendency to ally itself with Islam.” According to Pearson, Crittenden has also
thankfully given oxygen to claims by James Cook University’s Mervyn Bendle, the “fairly
conservative  academic  whose  work  sometimes  appears  in  [these]  pages,”  that  “the
discipline of critical terrorism studies has been captured by neo-Marxists of a postmodern
bent” (30). Both of these points are well beyond misunderstanding or untested proposition.
If Pearson means them sincerely he should be embarrassed and sacked. But of course he
does not  and  will  not  be.  These  are  deliberate  lies,  the  confabulations  of  an  eminent
right-wing culture warrior whose job is to vilify minorities and intellectuals (Bendle escapes
censure as an academic because he occasionally scribbles for the Murdoch press). It should
be observed,  too,  how the patent  absurdity  of  Pearson’s remarks reveals the extent  to
which he holds the intelligence of his readers in contempt. And he is not original in peddling
these toxic wares.
In  their  insightful—often  hilarious—study  of Australian  opinion  writers, The  War  on
Democracy,  Niall  Lucy  and  Steve  Mickler  identify  the  left-academic-Islam nexus as the
brain-child of former Treasurer-cum-memoirist Peter Costello. The germinal moment was “a
speech to the Australian American Leadership Dialogue forum at the Art Gallery of NSW in
2005” concerning anti-Americanism in Australian schools. Lucy and Mickler argue that  “it
was only a matter of time” before a conservative politician or journalist took the plunge to
link the left and terrorism, and Costello plunged brilliantly. He drew a mental map of the
Great  Chain  of  Being: left-wing academics taught teacher trainees to be anti-American;
teacher trainees became teachers and taught kids to be anti-American; anti-Americanism
morphs into anti-Westernism; anti-Westernism veers into terrorism (38). This is contempt
for  the reasoning  capacity  of  the  Australian  people  and,  further still,  contempt  for  any
observable  reality.  Not  for nothing  was Costello  generally  perceived  by  the  public  as a
politician whose very physiognomy radiated smugness and contempt.
Recycling  Costello,  Christopher  Pearson’s  article  subtly  interpellates  the  reader  as  an
ordinary, common-sense individual who instinctively feels what’s right and has no need to
think too much—thinking too much is the prerogative of “neo-Marxists” and postmodernists.
Ultimately,  Pearson’s  article  is  about  channelling  outrage:  directing  the  down-to-earth
passions of the Australian people against  stock-in-trade culture-war hate figures. And in
Pearson’s  paranoid  world,  words  like  “neo-Marxist”  and  “postmodern”  are  devoid  of
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historical  or  intellectual  meaning.  They  are,  as  Lucy  and  Mickler’s War  on  Democracy
repeatedly  demonstrate,  mere  ciphers  packed  with  the  baggage  of  contempt  for
independent critical thought itself.
Contempt is everywhere this weekend. The Weekend Australian’s colour magazine runs a
feature story on Malcolm Turnbull:  one of  those familiar profiles designed to reveal  the
everyday human touch of  the political  classes.  In  this puff-piece,  Jennifer Hewett  finds
Turnbull  has “a  restless passion  for participating  in  public life”  (20);  that  beneath  “the
aggressive political rhetoric […] behind the journalist turned lawyer turned banker turned
politician  turned  would-be  prime  minister  is  a  man  who  really  enjoys  that  human
interaction, however brief, with the many, many ordinary people he encounters” (16). Given
all this energetic turning, it’s a wonder that Turnbull has time for human interactions at all.
The  distinction  here  of  Turnbull  and  “many,  many  ordinary  people”  –  the  anonymous
masses  –  surely  runs  counter  to  Hewett’s  brief  to  personalise  and  quotidianise  him.
Likewise, those two key words, “however brief”, have an unfortunate, unintended effect.
Presumably meant to conjure a picture of Turnbull’s hectic schedules and serial turnings,
the words also convey the image of a patrician who begrudgingly knows one of the costs of
a political career is that common flesh must be pressed—but as gingerly as possible.
Hewett proceeds to disclose that Turnbull is “no conservative cultural warrior”, “onfounds
stereotypes” and “hates labels” (like any baby-boomer rebel) and “has always read widely
on political philosophy—his favourite is Edmund Burke”. He sees the “role of the state above
all as enabling people to do their best” but knows that “the main game is the economy” and
is “content to play mainstream gesture politics” (19). I am genuinely puzzled by this and
imagine  that  my  intelligence  is  being  held  in  contempt  once  again.  That  the  man  of
substance is given to populist  gesturing  is problematic enough; but  that  the Burke fan
believes the state is about personal empowerment is just too much. Maybe Turnbull is a fan
of  Burke’s  complex  writings  on  the  sublime  and  the  beautiful—but  no,  Hewett  avers,
Turnbull is engaged by Burke’s “political philosophy”. So what is it in Burke that Turnbull
finds to favour?
Turnbull’s invocation of Edmund Burke is empty, gestural and contradictory. The comfortable
notion that the state helps people to realise their potential is contravened by Burke’s view
that the state functions so “the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will
controlled,  and  their  passions brought  into subjection… by a power out  of  themselves”
(151). Nor does Burke believe that anyone of humble origins could or should rise to the top
of  the social  heap: “The occupation of  an  hair-dresser,  or of  a working  tallow-chandler,
cannot be a matter of honour to any person… the state suffers oppression, if such as they,
either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule” (138).
If  Turnbull’s  main  game  as  a  would-be  statesman  is  the  economy,  Burke  profoundly
disagrees:  “the  state  ought  not  to  be  considered  as nothing  better than  a partnership
agreement  in  a trade of  pepper and  coffee,  callico or tobacco,  or some other such low
concern… It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership  in every
virtue,  and  in  all  perfection”—a sublime entity,  not  an  economic manager (194).  Burke
understands,  long  before  Antonio  Gramsci  or  Louis  Althusser,  that  individuals  or  social
fractions must  be made admirably  “obedient”  to the state “by consent  or force” (195).
Burke has a verdict on mainstream gesture politics too: “When men of rank sacrifice all
ideas of dignity to an ambition without a distinct object, and work with low instruments and
for low ends, the whole composition [of the state] becomes low and base” (136).
Is Malcolm Turnbull so contemptuous of the public that he assumes nobody will notice the
gross discrepancies between his own ideals and what Burke stands for? His invocation  of
Burke is,  indeed,  “mainstream gesture  politics”:  on  one level,  “Burke”  signifies nothing
more than Turnbull’s performance of himself  as a deep thinker. In this process, the real
Edmund Burke is historically erased; reduced to the status of stage-prop in the theatrical
production of Turnbull’s mass-mediated identity. “Edmund Burke” is re-invented as a term
in an aesthetic repertoire.
This  transmutation  of  knowledge  and  history  into  mere  cipher  is  the  staple  trick  of
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culture-war discourse. Jennifer Hewett casts Turnbull as “no conservative culture warrior”,
but  he  certainly  shows  a  facility  with  culture-war  rhetoric.  And  as  much  as  Turnbull
“confounds stereotypes” his verbal gesture to Edmund Burke entrenches a stereotype: at
another level, the incantation “Edmund Burke” is implicitly meant to connect Turnbull with
conservative tradition—in the exact  way that  John Howard regularly self-nominated as  a
“Burkean conservative”.
This appeal to tradition effectively places “the people” in a power relation. Tradition has a
sublimity that  is bigger than us; it  precedes us and will  outlast  us. Consequently, for a
politician to claim that tradition has fashioned him, that he is welded to it or perhaps even
owns it  as part  of his heritage, is to glibly imply an authority greater than that of “the
many, many ordinary people”—Burke’s hair-dressers and tallow-chandlers—whose company
he so briefly enjoys.
In The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Terry Eagleton assesses one of Burke’s important legacies,
placing him beside another eighteenth-century thinker so loved by the right—Adam Smith.
Ideology of the Aesthetic is premised on the view that “Aesthetics is born as a discourse of
the body”; that the aesthetic gives form to the “primitive materialism” of human passions
and organises “the whole of our sensate life together… a society’s somatic, sensational life”
(13). Reading Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Eagleton discerns that society appears
as “an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand
agreeable effects”, like “any production of human art”. In Smith’s work, the “whole of social
life is aestheticized” and people inhabit “a social order so spontaneously cohesive that its
members no longer need to think about it.” In Burke, Eagleton discovers that the aesthetics
of “manners” can be understood in terms of Gramscian hegemony: “in the aesthetics of
social conduct, or ‘culture’ as it would later be called, the law is always with us, as the very
unconscious structure of our life”, and as a result conformity to a dominant ideological order
is deeply felt as pleasurable and beautiful (37, 42). When this conservative aesthetic enters
the realm of politics, Eagleton contends, the “right turn, from Burke” onwards follows a dark
trajectory: “forget about theoretical analysis… view society as a self-grounding organism, all
of  whose  parts  miraculously  interpenetrate  without  conflict  and  require  no  rational
justification. Think with the blood and the body. Remember that tradition is always wiser
and  richer  than  one’s  own  poor,  pitiable  ego.  It  is  this  line  of  descent,  in  one  of its
tributaries, which will lead to the Third Reich” (368–9).
2. Jean Baudrillard, the Nazis and Public Memory
In 1937, during the Spanish Civil War, the Third Reich’s Condor Legion of the Luftwaffe was
on  loan  to  Franco’s  forces.  On  26  April  that  year,  the  Condor  Legion  bombed  the
market-town of Guernica: the first deliberate attempt to obliterate an entire town from the
air and the first experiment in what became known as “terror bombing”—the targeting of
civilians. A legacy of this violence was Pablo Picasso’s monumental canvas Guernica – the
best-known anti-war painting in art history.
When US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations on 5 February 2003
to make the case for war on Iraq, he stopped to face the press in the UN building’s lobby.
The  doorstop  was globally  televised,  packaged  as  a  moment  of  incredible  significance:
history  in  the  making.  It  was also theatre:  a  moment  in  which  history  was staged  as
“event” and the real traces of history were carefully erased. Millions of viewers world-wide
were  undoubtedly  unaware  that  the  blue  backdrop  before  which  Powell  stood  was
specifically  designed  to  cover  the  full-scale  tapestry  copy  of  Picasso’s Guernica.  This
one-act,  agitprop  drama  was  a  splendid  example  of  politics  as  aesthetic  action:  a
“performance” of history in the making which required the loss of actual historical memory
enshrined  in Guernica.  Powell’s performance took  its cues from the culture wars,  which
require the ceaseless erasure of history and public memory—on this occasion enacted on a
breathtaking global, rather than national, scale.
Inside the UN chamber, Powell’s performance was equally staged-crafted. As he brandished
vials of  ersatz  anthrax,  the power-point  behind  him (the theatrical  set)  showed artists’
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impressions  of  imaginary mobile chemical weapons laboratories.  Powell  was playing lead
role in a kind of populist, hyperreal production. It was Jean Baudrillard’s postmodernism, no
less,  as  the  media  space  in  which  Powell  acted  out  the  drama  was  not  a  secondary
representation of reality but  a reality of its own; the overheads of mobile weapons labs
were simulacra, “models of a real without origins or reality”, pictures referring to  nothing
but themselves (2). In short, Powell’s performance was anchored in a “semiurgic” aesthetic;
and it was a dreadful real-life enactment of Walter Benjamin’s maxim that “All efforts to
render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war” (241).
For Benjamin, “Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without
affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate.” Fascism gave “these
masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves.” In turn, this required
“the introduction of aesthetics into politics”, the objective of which was “the production of
ritual values” (241). Under Adolf Hitler’s Reich, people were able to express themselves but
only  via  the  rehearsal  of  officially  produced  ritual  values:  by  their  participation in  the
disquisition on what Germany meant and what it meant to be German, by the aesthetic
regulation  of  their  passions.  As  Frederic  Spotts’  fine  study Hitler  and  the  Power  of
Aesthetics reveals, this passionate disquisition permeated public and private life, through
the artfully constructed total field of national narratives, myths, symbols and iconographies.
And the ritualistic reiteration of  national values in Nazi Germany hinged on two things:
contempt and memory loss.
By April 1945, as Berlin fell, Hitler’s contempt for the German people was at its apogee.
Hitler ordered a scorched earth operation: the destruction of everything from factories to
farms to food stores. The Russians would get nothing, the German people would perish.
Albert Speer refused to implement the plan and remembered that “Until then… Germany
and Hitler had been synonymous in my mind. But  now I  saw two entities opposed… A
passionate love of one’s country… a leader who seemed to hate his people” (Sereny 472).
But Hitler’s contempt for the German people was betrayed in the blusterous pages of Mein
Kampf years earlier: “The receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their intelligence is
small, but their power of forgetting is enormous” (165). On the back of this belief,  Hitler
launched what today would be called a culture war, with its Jewish folk devils, loathsome
Marxist intellectuals, incitement of popular passions, invented traditions, historical erasures
and constant iteration of values.
When Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer fled Fascism, landing in the United States, their
view of capitalist democracy borrowed from Benjamin and anticipated both Baudrillard and
Guy  Debord.  In  their  well-know  essay  on  “The  Culture  Industry”,  in Dialectic  of
Enlightenment,  they  applied  Benjamin’s  insight  on  mass  self-expression  and  the
maintenance of property relations and ritual values to American popular culture: “All are
free to dance and enjoy themselves”, but the freedom to choose how to do so “proves to be
the  freedom  to  choose  what  is  always  the  same”,  manufactured  by  monopoly  capital
(161–162). Anticipating Baudrillard, they found a society in which “only the copy appears:
in the movie theatre, the photograph; on the radio, the recording” (143). And anticipating
Debord’s  “perfected  denial  of  man”  they  found  a  society  where  work  and  leisure  were
structured  by  the  repetition-compulsion  principles  of  capitalism:  where  people  became
consumers who appeared  “s statistics on  research  organization  charts”  (123).  “Culture”
came  to  do  people’s  thinking  for  them:  “Pleasure  always  means  not  to  think  about
anything, to forget suffering even where it is shown” (144).
In  this  mass-mediated  environment,  a  culture  of  repetitions,  simulacra,  billboards  and
flickering  screens,  Adorno  and  Horkheimer  concluded  that  language  lost  its  historical
anchorages: “Innumerable people use words and expressions which they have either ceased
to understand or employ only because they trigger off conditioned reflexes” in precisely the
same way that the illusory “free” expression of passions in Germany operated, where words
were “debased by the Fascist pseudo-folk community” (166).
I know that the turf of the culture wars, the US and Australia, are not Fascist states; and I
know that “the first one to mention the Nazis loses the argument”. I know, too, that  there
are  obvious shortcomings in  Adorno and  Horkheimer’s  reactions  to  popular  culture  and
Musgrove http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/rt/printerFriend...
4 of 8 9/11/2011 5:36 PM
these have been widely criticised. However, I would suggest that there is a great deal of
value still in Frankfurt School analyses of what we might call the “authoritarian popular”
which can be applied to the conservative prosecution of populist culture wars today. Think,
for example, how the concept of a “pseudo folk community” might well describe the earthy,
common-sense  public  constructed  and  interpellated  by  right-wing  culture  warriors:
America’s Joe Six-Pack, John Howard’s battlers or Kevin Rudd’s working families.
In  fact,  Adorno  and  Horkheimer’s  observations  on  language  go  to  the  heart  of  a
contemporary  culture  war  strategy.  Words  lose  their  history,  becoming  ciphers  and
“triggers” in a politicised lexicon. Later, Roland Barthes would write that this is a form of
myth-making: “myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things.” Barthes
reasoned further that “Bourgeois ideology continuously transforms the products of history
into essential  types”,  generating  a  “cultural  logic”  and  an  ideological  re-ordering of  the
world (142). Types such as “neo-Marxist”, “postmodernist” and “Burkean conservative”.
Surely,  Benjamin’s assessment  that  Fascism gives “the  people”  the  occasion  to express
itself, but only through “values”, describes the right’s  pernicious incitement of the mythic
“dispossessed mainstream” to reclaim its voice: to shout  down the noisy minorities—the
gays, greenies, blacks, feminists, multiculturalists and neo-Marxist postmodernists—who’ve
apparently  been  running  the  show.  Even  more  telling,  Benjamin’s  insight  that  the
incitement  to  self-expression  is  connected  to  the  maintenance  of  property  relations,  to
economic power, is crucial to understanding the contemptuous conduct of culture wars.
3. Jesus Dunked in Urine from Kansas to Cronulla
American commentator Thomas Frank bases his study What’s the Matter with Kansas? on
this very point. Subtitled How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, Frank’s book is a
striking  analysis  of  the  indexation  of  Chicago  School  free-market  reform  and  the
mobilisation of  “explosive social  issues—summoning  public outrage over everything  from
busing to un-Christian art—which it  then marries to pro-business policies”; but  it  is the
“economic achievements” of free-market capitalism, “not the forgettable skirmishes of the
never-ending  culture wars” that  are conservatism’s “greatest  monuments.” Nevertheless,
the culture wars are necessary as Chicago School  economic thinking  consigns American
communities  to  the  rust  belt.  The  promise  of  “free-market  miracles”  fails  ordinary
Americans, Frank reasons, leaving them in “backlash” mode: angry, bewildered and broke.
And in this context, culture wars are a convenient form of anger management: “Because
some artist decides to shock the hicks by dunking Jesus in urine, the entire planet must
remake itself along the lines preferred” by nationalist, populist moralism and free-market
fundamentalism (5).
When John  Howard  received  the neo-conservative American  Enterprise Institute’s Irving
Kristol  Award,  on  6  March  2008,  he  gave  a  speech  in  Washington  titled  “Sharing  Our
Common Values”. The nub of the speech was Howard’s revelation that he understood the
index of neo-liberal economics and culture wars precisely as Thomas Frank does. Howard
told the AEI audience that under his prime ministership Australia had “pursued reform and
further  modernisation  of  our  economy”  and  that  this  inevitably  meant  “dislocation  for
communities”. This “reform-dislocation” package needed the palliative of a culture war, with
his government preaching the “consistency and reassurance” of   “our nation’s traditional
values… pride in her history”; his government “became assertive about the intrinsic worth of
our national identity. In the process we ended the seemingly endless seminar about that
identity which had been in progress for some years.” Howard’s boast that his government
ended  the “seminar”  on  national  identity  insinuates an  important  point.  “Seminar”  is  a
culture-war  cipher  for  intellection,  just  as  “pride”  is  code  for  passion;  so  Howard’s
self-proclaimed achievement, in Terry Eagleton’s terms, was to valorise “the blood and the
body” over “theoretical analysis”. This speaks stratospheric contempt: ordinary people have
their identity fashioned for them; they need not  think about it,  only feel  it  deeply  and
passionately according to “ritual values”. Undoubtedly this paved the way to Cronulla.
The rubric  of  Howard’s speech—“Sharing  Our Common Values”—was both  a  homage to
Musgrove http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/rt/printerFriend...
5 of 8 9/11/2011 5:36 PM
international  neo-conservatism  and  a  reminder  that  culture  wars  are  a  trans-national
phenomenon. In his address, Howard said that in all his “years in politics” he had not heard
a  “more  evocative  political  slogan”  than  Ronald  Reagan’s  “Morning  in  America”—the
rhetorical catch-cry for moral re-awakening that  launched the culture wars. According to
Lawrence Grossberg,  America’s culture wars were predicated  on the perception that  the
nation was afflicted by “a crisis of  our lack of  passion,  of  not  caring  enough about  the
values we hold… a crisis of nihilism which, while not restructuring our ideological beliefs, has
undermined our ability to organise effective action on their behalf”; and this “New Right”
alarmism “operates in the conjuncture of economics and popular culture” and “a popular
struggle by which culture can lead politics” in the passionate pursuit of ritual values (31–2).
When popular culture leads politics in this way we are in the zone of the image, myth and
Adorno  and  Horkheimer’s  “trigger  words”  that  have  lost  their  history.  In  this  context,
McKenzie Wark observes that “radical writers influenced by Marx will see the idea of culture
as compensation for a fragmented and alienated life as a con. Guy Debord, perhaps the last
of the great revolutionary thinkers of Europe, will call it “the spectacle”’ (20). Adorno and
Horkheimer might well have called it “the authoritarian popular”.
As Jonathan  Charteris-Black’s  work  capably  demonstrates,  all  politicians have  their own
idiolect: their personally coded language, preferred narratives and myths; their own vision
of who “the people” might or should be that is conjured in their words. But the language of
the  culture  wars is  different.  It  is  not  a  personal  idiolect.  It  is  a shared  vocabulary,  a
networked  vernacular,  a  pervasive  trans-national  aesthetic  that  pivots  on  the  fact  that
words  like  “neo-Marxist”,  “postmodern”  and  “Edmund  Burke”  have  no  historical  or
intellectual  context  or content:  they exist  as the ciphers of  “values”.  And the fact  that
culture warriors continually mouth them is a supreme act of contempt: it robs the public of
its memory. And that’s why, as Lucy and Mickler’s War on Democracy so wittily argues, if
there are any postmodernists left they’ll be on the right.
Benjamin,  Adorno,  Horkheimer  and,  later,  Debord  and  Grossberg  understood  how  the
political  activation of  the popular constitutes a hegemonic project. The result  is nothing
short of persuading “the people” to collaborate in its own oppression. The activation of the
popular  is  perfectly  geared  to  an  age  where  the  main  stage  of  political  life  is  the
mainstream media; an age in  which,  Charteris-Black notes,  political  classes assume the
general antipathy of publics to social change and act on the principle that the most effective
political messages are sold to “the people” by an appeal “to familiar experiences”—market
populism (10). In her substantial  study The Persuaders,  Sally Young cites an Australian
Labor Party survey, conducted by pollster Rod Cameron in the late 1970s, in which the
party’s message machine was finely tuned to this populist position. The survey also dripped
with contempt for ordinary people: their “Interest in political philosophy… is very low… They
are  essentially  the  products  (and  supporters)  of  mass  market  commercialism”.  Young
observes that  this  view of  “the  people”  was the  foundation  of  a  new order of  political
advertising  and  the  conduct  of  politics  on  the  mass-media  stage.  Cameron’s  profile  of
“ordinary people” went on to assert that they are fatally attracted to “a moderate leader
who is strong… but can understand and represent their value system” (47): a prescription
for populist discourse which begs the question of whether the values a politician or  party
represent  via  the  media  are  ever  really  those  of  “the  people”.  More  likely,  people  are
hegemonised into a value system which they take to be theirs. Writing of the media side of
the equation, David Salter raises the point that when media “moguls thunder about ‘the
public interest’ what they really mean is ‘what we think the public is interested in”, which is
quite another matter… Why this self-serving deception is still so sheepishly accepted by the
same public it is so often used to violate remains a mystery” (40).
Sally Young’s Persuaders retails a story that she sees as “symbolic” of the new world of
mass-mediated  political  life.  The  story  concerns  Mark  Latham  and  his  “revolutionary”
journeys to regional Australia to meet the people. “When a political leader who holds a
public meeting is dubbed a ‘revolutionary’”, Young rightly observes, “something has gone
seriously  wrong”.  She  notes  how  Latham’s  “use  of  old-fashioned  ‘meet-
and-greet’campaigning methods was seen as a breath of fresh air because it was unlike the
type of  packaged,  stage-managed  and  media-dependent  politics that  have  become the
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norm in Australia.” Except that it wasn’t. “A media pack of thirty journalists trailed Latham
in a bus”, meaning, that he was not meeting the people at all (6–7). He was traducing the
people as participants in a media spectacle, as his “meet and greet” was designed to fill the
image-banks of  print  and  electronic media.  Even  meeting  the people becomes a media
pseudo-event  in  which  the  people  impersonate  the  people  for  the  camera’s  benefit;  a
spectacle as artfully deceitful as Colin Powell’s UN performance on Iraq.
If the success of this kind of “self-serving deception” is a mystery to David Salter, it would
not  be  so  to  the  Frankfurt  School.  For  them,  an  understanding  of  the  processes  of
mass-mediated  politics  sits  somewhere  near  the  core  of  their  analysis  of  the  culture
industries in the “democratic” world. I think the Frankfurt school should be restored to a
more important role in the project of cultural studies. Apart from an aversion to jazz and
other supposedly “elitist” heresies, thinkers like Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer and their
progeny  Debord  have  a  functional  claim  to  provide  the  theory  for  us  to  expose  the
machinations of the politics of contempt and its aesthetic ruses.
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